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NOTE
A License to Infringe: The Tenth Circuit’s Reliance on the
Reasonable Observer Test to Determine Symbolic Speech
Protection of License Plates
Introduction
The First Amendment of the United States Constitution holds, “Congress
shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech . . . .” 1 While a plain
reading of the First Amendment only seems to protect “speech,” courts
“have long recognized that its protection does not end at the spoken or
written word.” 2 Although the Supreme Court has rejected “the view that an
apparently limitless variety of conduct can be labeled ‘speech’ whenever
the person engaging in the conduct intends thereby to express an idea,”3 it
has “acknowledged that conduct may be ‘sufficiently imbued with elements
of communication to fall within the scope of the First . . . Amendment[].” 4
While this broadening of speech protection is fitting, the absence of a
concrete definition of what conduct deserves the protection of the First
Amendment has divided courts and legal scholars for decades. 5
Specifically, ambiguous Supreme Court decisions regarding symbolic
speech have left lower courts in disarray, each either utilizing a different
version of, or completely disregarding, the same test. 6 Courts have,

1. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
2. Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 404 (1989).
3. United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376 (1968).
4. Johnson, 491 U.S. at 404 (quoting Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405, 409 (1974)
(per curiam)).
5. See R. George Wright, What Counts as "Speech" in the First Place?: Determining
the Scope of the Free Speech Clause, 37 PEPP. L. REV. 1217, 1225 (2010).
6. See, e.g., Cressman v. Thompson, 798 F.3d 938, 957-58 (10th Cir. 2015) (finding, at
a minimum, that a claimant must articulate a message a viewer would perceive from a
symbol to which he objects and that First Amendment protection is only afforded where the
articulated message to which the claimant objects mirrors that of the “reasonable observer”);
Blau v. Fort Thomas Pub. Sch. Dist., 401 F.3d 381, 388-89 (6th Cir. 2005) (finding the
particularized message portion of the Spence-Johnson test must not be narrow or succinctly
articulable); Church of the Am. Knights of the Ku Klux Klan v. Kerik, 356 F.3d 197, 205
n.6 (2d Cir. 2004) (finding the Spence-Johnson test to be the test for symbolic speech First
Amendment protection); Holloman ex rel. Holloman v. Harland, 370 F.3d 1252, 1270 (11th
Cir. 2004) (relaxing the Spence-Johnson test by only requiring that a reasonable person
would interpret any message as opposed to a specific message for the test for symbolic
speech First Amendment protection); Tenafly Eruv Ass'n v. Borough of Tenafly, 309 F.3d
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however, consistently affirmed that one consideration has the potential to
be a guidepost for categories of symbolic speech determinations: context.
Adopting contextual considerations in every symbolic speech analysis is a
much-needed stride towards uniformity in this area of law, which is
becoming increasingly imperative as the way people convey messages
continues to expand into new forums of abstract expression. 7 As more and
more types of symbolic speech forms come before courts, the utilization of
context as a guiding factor in determining free speech protection can aid
courts in promptly and uniformly adapting to these new forms. 8
In Cressman v. Thompson, 9 the Tenth Circuit determined whether the
First Amendment accorded protection to symbolic speech in the context of
license plates featuring Native American religious symbols. Although its
analysis was not an unreasonable interpretation of Supreme Court
precedent, the court’s complete reliance on the “reasonable observer’s”
perception of the symbol at issue improperly limits the scope of reasonable
objections that complainants may make regarding symbolic speech
displayed on state-issued license plates. Under the Tenth Circuit’s holding,
citizens are essentially compelled to either display the words and symbols
on a state-issued license plate—which is affixed on private property for
numerous people to see—or suffer a penalty. 10 Thus, in the specific context
of license plates, where citizens are compelled to communicate a message
of the government’s choosing, the components of the symbolic speech test
historically used by courts 11 should only be used as persuasive, not
mandatory, factors in the determination of symbolic speech protection.
Further, where the complainant’s interpretation of the symbol is (1)
144, 160 (3d Cir. 2002) (finding the particularized message portion of the Spence-Johnson
test to be unnecessary for the test for symbolic speech First Amendment protection).
7. See Caitlin Housley, A Uniform Test Isn't Here Right Now, but Please Leave a
Message: How Altering the Spence Symbolic Speech Test Can Better Meet the Needs of an
Expressive Society, 103 KY. L.J. 657, 658 (2015) (“[P]eople rely on technology, clothing,
hairstyles, brands, and even tattoos to express their personalities and send messages about
what they value in life.”).
8. See id.
9. 798 F.3d 938.
10. Obscuring any part of a state-issued license plate is illegal under Oklahoma law, see
47 OKLA. STAT. § 1113(A)(2) (2011), so Cressman’s options were to either 1) obscure the
Native American image and be subject to prosecution, or 2) pay an extra fee for a specialty
license plate.
11. The symbolic speech test historically used by courts is the Spence-Johnson test,
which requires (1) an intent to convey a particularized message and (2) a great likelihood
that the message will be understood by viewers. See Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405,
410-11 (1974) (per curiam).
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reasonable and (2) ideological, his or her First Amendment claim should be
successful and, at the very least, he or she should be allowed to display a
specialty license plate for the same price as a state-issued license plate.
Part I of this Note examines how the jurisprudence of symbolic speech
has evolved since its emergence in Spence v. Washington12 and Texas v.
Johnson. 13 Part II discusses how the doctrines of compelled and
governmental speech have impacted the courts’ free speech analysis of
state-issued license plates. Next, Part III provides an overview of the Tenth
Circuit’s Cressman v. Thompson decision involving speech protection of
symbols found on Oklahoma’s state-issued license plate. 14 Finally, Part IV
discusses how (1) the Cressman court improperly relied on the reasonableobserver test to reach its holding, and (2) implicit in the Supreme Court’s
decision in Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Group of
Boston 15 is a need for a flexible test for symbolic speech protection,
requiring the consideration of context. Thus, in the specific context of
license plates, a citizen’s reasonable and ideological interpretation of the
message on a license plate to which he or she objects should afford him or
her the free speech protection of the First Amendment.
I. Symbolic Speech Jurisprudence
A. Spence v. Washington and Texas v. Johnson: The Emergence of the Test
The Supreme Court first articulated a test for assessing the First
Amendment protection of symbolic speech in Spence v. Washington. 16 In
Spence, a college student hung an American flag out of his apartment
window on private property. 17 Contrary to custom, the American flag was
positioned upside down and with peace signs made out of black tape
attached to the front and back. 18 The student explained that he “wanted
people to know that [he] thought America stood for peace.” 19 The flag was
noticeable to passersby, including police officers, who seized the flag and

12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.

418 U.S. 405.
491 U.S. 397 (1989).
798 F.3d 938.
515 U.S. 557 (1995).
418 U.S. at 410-11.
Id. at 406.
Id.
Id. at 409.
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arrested the student for violating a State of Washington improper-use
statute. 20
The Court recognized that although the student’s message was not
conveyed via spoken word, he was still “engaged in a form of
communication.” 21 Thus, the issue was “whether his activity was
sufficiently imbued with elements of communication to fall within the scope
of the First and Fourteenth Amendments.” 22 In its analysis, the Court
recognized the communicative value of flags as symbols, as well as the
context in which the student used the flag and peace sign as symbols. 23
Based on these considerations, the state’s improper-use statue was held to
be unconstitutional as applied to the expressions of the student—who was
attempting to send a message about peace 24—as it would likely be
understood by those who viewed it due to the then-current governmental
domestic and foreign affairs. 25 According to this test, symbolic speech is
protected by the First Amendment where there is “[a]n intent to convey a
particularized message . . . and in the surrounding circumstances the
likelihood [is] great that the message [will] be understood by those who
view[] it.” 26
The test articulated in Spence was reaffirmed in Texas v. Johnson, 27
where Johnson burned an American flag at the 1984 Republican National
Convention to protest certain Reagan administration policies.28 The Court
held that because Johnson’s conduct was both expressive and overtly
political, it was “intentional and overwhelmingly apparent,” and thus
deserving of First Amendment protection. 29
The Court’s analysis in these two cases has come to be known as the
Spence-Johnson test, under which symbolic speech is protected by the First
Amendment if there is (1) an intent to convey a particularized message and
(2) a great likelihood that the message will be understood by viewers. 30
20. Id. at 406-07.
21. Id. at 409.
22. Id. (emphasis added).
23. Id. at 410.
24. The student testified that the upside-down peace signs on the flag were intended to
protest the United States’ invasion of Cambodia and the killings at Kent State University in
1970. Id. at 408.
25. See id. at 410.
26. Id. at 410-11.
27. 491 U.S. 397 (1989).
28. Id. at 399.
29. See id. at 406.
30. See Spence, 418 U.S. at 410-11.
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Simple though this test may appear, lower courts have struggled to apply it
uniformly due to their varying interpretations of the Supreme Court’s use of
the test in Hurley, 31 resulting in confusion regarding the scope of protection
afforded to various forms of symbolic speech.32
B. Hurley v. GLIB: Source of Disarray
Undoubtedly seeing the problems with the application of the SpenceJohnson test, the Court once again addressed the issue of symbolic speech
in Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual Group of Boston. 33
Although Hurley mainly dealt with the expressive content of parades
protected by the First Amendment, 34 the Court also noted problems with the
Spence-Johnson test. 35 According to the Hurley Court, “a narrow,
succinctly articulable message is not a condition of constitutional
protection, which if confined to expressions conveying a ‘particularized
message,’ would never reach the unquestionably shielded painting of
Jackson Pollock, music of Arnold Schoenberg, or Jabberwocky verse of
Lewis Carroll.” 36 Although the Court attempted to provide clarity regarding
the Spence-Johnson test by noting the requirement of a particularized
message may not always reach apparent constitutionally protected symbolic
speech, 37 the only thing that is clear after Hurley is that lower courts are
even more confused as to when symbolic speech prompts First Amendment
protection.38 This uncertainty—and, consequently, the conflicting opinions
of lower courts—is inconsistent with the values of justice and fairness that
the judicial system strives to embody. The Supreme Court tried to alleviate
the symbolic speech problem in Hurley by recognizing that the SpenceJohnson test may not always adequately recognize protected symbolic
speech, but it ultimately enlarged the problem. 39 First Amendment
protections are the cornerstone of America’s free, democratic society, and
accordingly the Court should articulate a clear test for symbolic speech that
will allow for a uniform application and protect symbolic speech when
appropriate.

31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.

515 U.S. 557 (1995).
See cases cited supra note 6 and accompanying text.
515 U.S. 557.
See id. at 559.
See id. at 569.
Id. (citation omitted).
See id.
See cases cited supra note 6 and accompanying text.
See cases cited supra note 6.
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II. License Plate Jurisprudence: Compelled and Government Speech
In the specific context of state-issued license plates, issues pertaining to
symbolic speech have been further complicated by the need to consider the
doctrines of compelled speech and government speech. The compelled
speech doctrine provides that “the right of freedom of thought protected by
the First Amendment against state action includes both the right to speak
freely and the right to refrain from speaking at all.”40 Government speech,
on the other hand, “allows the government [as the speaker] to make content
based choices when it comes to speech,” just like a private citizen. 41
Although this appears to indicate that the government lacks any restraint in
expressing government speech, “the Free Speech Clause itself may
constrain the government’s speech if . . . the government seeks to compel
private persons to convey the government’s speech.” 42 Such an issue has
arisen in every level of the courts in the context of state-issued license
plates, where the plates contain words and symbols of the government’s
choosing and are required to be affixed to the private property of all citizens
driving automobiles, subsequently compelling them to display the
government’s message.
A. Walker v. Texas: License Plates Are Government Speech
While there had been tension in lower courts relating to whether speech
on state-issued license plates was government or private speech, Cressman
recognized that Walker v. Texas explicitly settled the issue.43 In Walker, the
Court held that specialty license plates issued by the State of Texas were
government speech because, just like state-issued non-specialty license
plates, each plate serves a governmental purpose, the government approves
of the contents of the plate, and states have long used license plates to

40. Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 714 (1977); see W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v.
Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 633-34 (1943).
41. David Mangone, Speech at a Crossroads: The Intersection of Symbolic Speech,
Government Speech, and the State License Plate, 8 FED. CTS. L. REV. 97, 108 (2014); see
Walker v. Tex. Div., Sons of Confederate Veterans, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 2239, 2245 (2015)
(“When government speaks, it is not barred by the Free Speech Clause from determining the
content of what it says.”).
42. Walker, 135 S. Ct. at 2246.
43. See Cressman v. Thompson, 798 F.3d 938, 965 (10th Cir. 2015) (McHugh, J.,
concurring).
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convey governmental messages. 44 Therefore, state-issued license plates
present compelled speech that may implicate the First Amendment, since
speech on license plates is government speech and physical license plates
must be affixed to private persons’ vehicles.45 With the issue of
determining which category of speech license plates most appropriately fit
being settled, the Court next grappled with license plate compelled speech
in the form of an express message.
B. Wooley v. Maynard: A Successful Objection to a Morally Repugnant
License Plate
Wooley v. Maynard involved license plates and compelled express
government speech—not symbolic speech. 46 In Wooley, the issue
surrounded New Hampshire’s state-issued license plates, which contained
the written phrase “Live Free or Die.”47 The Maynards, a married couple
asserting membership in the Jehovah’s Witnesses faith, found the phrase to
be repugnant to their religious beliefs and subsequently covered that portion
of the license plate affixed to their vehicle.48 Covering any part of a license
plate violates New Hampshire state law, and consequently the husband was
arrested. 49 The Maynards then brought an action to enjoin enforcement of
the statute where, upon appeal, the Court held that a citizen may not be
required by the State to disseminate an ideological message “by displaying
it on his private property in a manner and for the express purpose that it be
observed and read by the public.” 50 With this holding, the Court recognized
that a state has no right to “require[] that [individuals] use their private
property as a ‘mobile billboard’ for the State’s ideological message—or
suffer a penalty . . . .” 51 Although this holding clearly addressed the
constitutionality of express ideological messages on license plates, the
outcome of a compelled-speech objection to displaying a license plate in

44. See Walker, 135 S. Ct. at 2249-50.
45. See Cressman, 798 F.3d at 949 (quoting Walker, 135 U.S. at 2252-53) (“[E]ven
though license plate designs may be government speech, drivers ‘convey the messages
communicated through those designs,’ and a State runs afoul of the First Amendment if it
‘compel[s] a party to express a view with which the private party disagrees.’” (citations
omitted)).
46. 430 U.S. 705 (1977).
47. Id. at 706-07.
48. Id. at 707-08.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 713.
51. Id. at 715.
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instances where the government message is less clear, as with symbolic
speech, remains unsettled.
C. The Uncertainty of Symbolic Speech and License Plates
While it is established that state-issued license plates are government
speech, which only implicate First Amendment protections where the
government seeks to compel private persons to convey a message that they
find morally objectionable, 52 determining the government’s message is still
unclear—particularly when the message is in the form of a symbol. 53
Although symbolic-speech jurisprudence may be characterized as a sea of
uncertainty, as evidenced by the multitude of variations of the SpenceJohnson test utilized by lower courts, a common thread in nearly every
symbolic-speech case is the consideration of context.54 In the specific
context of license plates, the Tenth Circuit’s approach to determining
symbolic-speech protections in Cressman v. Thompson improperly denied
the First Amendment right to refrain from speaking.
III. Cressman v. Thompson
Pursuant to title 47, section 1113.3 of the Oklahoma Statutes, the
Oklahoma License Plate Design Task Force was created in 2007 to update
the Oklahoma state-issued license plate. 55 Because one of the goals in the
plate redesign was to specifically “market Oklahoma as a tourist
destination,” the resulting design included the words “Native America” and
an image of a Native American shooting an arrow into the sky (the “Native
American image”). 56 The Native American image is based on an Allan
Houser sculpture, Sacred Rain Arrow, “which depicts the story of a young
Apache warrior who fired an arrow that was blessed by a medicine man
into the heavens; as the tale goes, the arrow carried prayers for rain to the
Spirit World.” 57

52. See id. at 715-17.
53. See cases cited supra note 6 and accompanying text.
54. See, e.g., Hurley v. Irish-Am. Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Grp. of Bos., 515 U.S. 557,
576-77 (1995); Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405, 409 (1974) (per curiam); Tinker v. Des
Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 510 (1969); Cressman v. Thompson, 798
F.3d 938, 953 (10th Cir. 2015); Blau v. Fort Thomas Pub. Sch. Dist., 401 F.3d 381, 395 (6th
Cir. 2005).
55. Cressman, 798 F.3d at 943.
56. Id.
57. Id.
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A. Cressman’s Objection and Failed Remedial Attempts
Keith Cressman claimed to hold “historic Christian beliefs,” including
monotheism, and consequently objected to the Native American image on
the Oklahoma license plate because he believed it conveyed the same
message as that behind the Sacred Rain Arrow sculpture, including
teachings about “multiple gods” and “the arrow [as] an intermediary for
prayer.” 58
Based on his contrary beliefs, Cressman made several attempts to avoid
displaying the Native American image. 59 Cressman covered up the Native
American image on his license plate, but was informed by the Oklahoma
Tax Commission’s Tag Agency that doing so was illegal.60 The Tax
Commission then told him that he could buy a specialty license plate
without the Native American image for an extra charge. 61 While Cressman
did buy specialty license plates at an increased price for a time, he later
notified numerous state officials that he did not want to pay more for a
specialty license plate and instead wished to either cover up the Native
American image on a standard license plate or obtain a specialty license
plate at no additional charge. 62 Cressman received no response to his
request and in November 2011 filed a civil-rights lawsuit pursuant to 42
U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that his First and Fourteenth Amendment rights
were violated by being forced by the State of Oklahoma to display the
Native American image carrying a pantheistic message in conflict with his
personal beliefs. 63
After the district court ruled that Cressman’s First Amendment rights
were not violated, 64 Cressman appealed to the United States Court of
Appeals for the Tenth Circuit, which considered whether Cressman “ha[d]
been unconstitutionally compelled to speak by Oklahoma’s requirement
that he either display the Native American image on his vehicle license
plate or pay an extra fee for a specialty plate.”65 To make a valid
compelled-speech claim, the court explained that “a party must establish (1)
speech; (2) to which he objects; that is (3) compelled by some

58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.

Id.
Id.
Id.; 47 OKLA. STAT. §§ 1113(A)(2), 1151(A)(2) (2011 & Supp. 2012).
Cressman, 798 F.3d at 943-44.
Id. at 944.
Id.
See id.
Id. at 950.
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governmental action.” 66 Thus, the court considered (1) whether the Native
American image was pure or symbolic speech, and, if so, (2) whether
Cressman objected to the message it conveys. 67
B. Not Pure, But Symbolic Speech
The Tenth Circuit found that the Native American image was not pure
speech. 68 The court explained that pure-speech analysis is performed on a
case-by-case basis, and the context of the message guides the court’s
decision. 69 Because the image could be found on thousands of license plates
throughout Oklahoma, and because such a plate "is not an exercise of selfexpression entitled to pure-speech protection,” the Native American image
is not pure speech. 70
The court next assessed whether the Native American image is symbolic
speech that implicates the First Amendment. 71 After discussing the
historical jurisprudence of symbolic speech protection under Spence and
Johnson, the court turned to Hurley, the source of lower court disarray. 72
The Tenth Circuit asserted, “[T]he Court’s decision in Hurley ‘suggested
the Spence-Johnson factors are not necessarily prerequisites for First
Amendment protection for symbolic speech.” 73 It then noted the “divergent
approaches” courts have taken to reconcile Hurley with the Spence-Johnson
test, and stated that the Tenth Circuit has “merely observe[d] that Hurley
suggests that a Spence-Johnson particularized message standard may at
times be too high a bar for First Amendment protection,” but that it has
never articulated a specific test post-Hurley. 74
C. Avoiding the Problem of Hurley and Banking on the Reasonable
Observer
The Tenth Circuit then asserted that, while it is difficult to find a
common approach for assessing symbolic speech protection under the First
Amendment across circuits, “at a minimum they require that the display be
of such a character that a viewer could draw an identifiable inference from
66. Id. at 951.
67. See id. at 950.
68. See id. at 952-54.
69. See id. at 953.
70. Id. at 950.
71. See id. at 954.
72. See id. at 955-56.
73. Id. at 955 (citing Cressman v. Thompson (Cressman I), 719 F.3d 1139, 1149 (10th
Cir. 2013)).
74. Id. at 956 (alteration in original) (citing Cressman I, 719 F.3d at 1150).

https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol69/iss2/5

2017]

NOTE

329

it.” 75 Therefore, “the Spence-Johnson test—even if modified by Hurley—
would oblige Mr. Cressman to articulate some inference drawn from the
image that a viewer would perceive.” 76
Although Cressman alleged that a viewer of the Native American image
would associate it with the Apache legend, pantheism, and prayer, the court
disagreed. 77 In reaching that conclusion, the court used a method never
explicitly utilized by other courts in this type of analysis. Because the
district court and the parties discussed the Establishment Clause’s
“reasonable observer test” in assessing what a viewer of the symbol would
perceive, the Tenth Circuit decided to use this test, as it "appear[s] to be
congruent with symbolic-speech jurisprudence[ because] in that area [of
symbolic speech], courts have focused on whether a display communicates
a message that is identifiable by reasonable persons.” 78 As a result, the
court referred back to Spence, asserting that:
[I]n the symbolic-speech context, the reasonable person focuses
on “context [to] give meaning to [a] symbol” and is cognizant of
the “then-current domestic and foreign affairs of his
government,” “issue[s] of intense public concern,” the
“environment” in which an expressive act occurs, and the
reasons for the speaker’s expression. 79
In analyzing the Native American image within the bounds of the
Establishment Clause’s reasonable observer test, the court discussed that
while the reasonable observer would be aware of the Houser sculpture and
the Apache legend, he would also be aware of other important contextual
factors 80 including: the license plate designers’ aim to promote tourism with
the selected image; Oklahoma’s Native American history; and the public,
the Oklahoma Department of Tourism, and the Oklahoma Department of
Public Safety’s opportunity to provide input to the license plate task force. 81
The court determined that, based on his knowledge, the reasonable observer
would not view the Oklahoma license plate as communicating the message
of the Sacred Rain Arrow sculpture, but rather “that Oklahoma’s history

75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.

Id. at 957.
Id.
See id. at 957, 960.
Id. at 958.
Id. at 958 (quoting Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405, 410 (1974) (per curiam)).
Id. at 959-60.
Id.
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and culture has been strongly influenced by Native Americans.” 82
Cressman did not object to this message.83 In fact, Cressman repeatedly
stated throughout litigation that he did not object to the message of
Oklahoma’s Native American history and culture. 84 Instead, he objected to
a message regarding the Sacred Rain Arrow, which the court believed he
incorrectly asserted the Oklahoma license plate conveys based on his
subjective misunderstanding of the Native American image’s message. 85
Thus, the court held that although the Native American image is symbolic
speech, Cressman did not find the message it conveys to be unacceptable
and was not compelled to speak by the State in violation of his First
Amendment rights. 86
IV. While Technically Not Wrong, the Tenth Circuit Was Not Right
A. The Cressman Court Improperly Relied on the Reasonable-Observer
Test to Determine First Amendment Protection of Symbolic Speech on
License Plates
In reaching the determination that Cressman was not compelled to speak
in violation of his First Amendment rights, the Tenth Circuit articulated a
problematic approach to determining the message of symbolic speech by
borrowing the Establishment Clause’s reasonable observer test, and,
accordingly, did not reach the best decision. 87 This test was prompted by
and contingent upon the court’s assertion that symbolic-speech
jurisprudence, at a minimum, requires an inference to be drawn from the
image which a reasonable viewer would perceive. 88 By wholly relying on
the Establishment Clause’s reasonable observer test in determining whether
Cressman had the right to refrain from displaying the Native American
image on his license plate, the Tenth Circuit ignored and abandoned the
fundamental principles of free speech. A citizen’s First Amendment right to
free speech is a personal right, allowing him or her to speak or refuse to
speak for any reason or absolutely no reason.89 Utilizing the reasonable
82. Id. at 960.
83. See id. at 950-51, 963.
84. See id.
85. See id. at 963.
86. See id. at 963-64.
87. See id. at 958-60.
88. See id. at 958.
89. See Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 714 (1977) (“[T]he right of freedom of
thought protected by the First Amendment against state action includes both the right to
speak freely and the right to refrain from speaking at all.”).
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observer test in assessing symbolic speech confines free speech protection
to the limited message that a group of judges determines a reasonable
observer would perceive from an image on a license plate—an outcome that
results in the deterioration of constitutional rights.
With its ruling in Cressman, the Tenth Circuit formulated a new standard
for analyzing free speech claims involving symbolic and compelled speech.
Not only is the symbolic-speech message of the debated image confined to
what the court deems a reasonable observer would perceive, but the
complainant must specifically articulate the reasonable observer’s
perception and object to it in order to make a successful claim. 90
Furthermore, if the complainant’s objection is not identical to the specific
perception of the reasonable observer, he or she has no valid claim and no
choice but to display the image. 91 This requirement is not consistent with
the Supreme Court’s treatment of compelled-speech cases, specifically in
those involving license plates.
B. Compelled Speech and License Plates: At Odds With the Tenth’s
Circuit’s Exclusive Use of the “Reasonable Observer”
The Supreme Court explained that license plates are essentially “mobile
billboard[s]” on display to hundreds of people daily, as driving an
automobile is “a virtual necessity for most Americans.” 92 Once words or
images have been classified as speech, a citizen should not be forced to say
or display the message, regardless of his reason for doing or not doing so.
Thus, by forcing a citizen to either display an image he or she finds
objectionable that may be classified as symbolic speech on a license plate
or suffer a penalty, the citizen is compelled to speak by the government in
violation of his or her First Amendment rights.93 Furthermore, the approach
of limiting successful symbolic-speech claims to those where the claimant
articulates an objection identical to what the court deems a reasonable
observer would perceive improperly disregards established jurisprudence
involving symbolic speech.94
In Wooley, the Court found that a citizen’s First Amendment rights were
violated when he was compelled to display the state-issued license plate
90. Cressman, 798 F.3d at 956-57.
91. See id.
92. Wooley, 430 U.S. at 715.
93. See id. at 714-15.
94. See generally Walker v. Tex. Div., Sons of Confederate Veterans, Inc., 135 S. Ct.
2239 (2015); Hurley v. Irish-Am. Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Grp. of Bos., 515 U.S. 557
(1995); Wooley, 430 U.S. 705.
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including the words “Live Free or Die.” 95 While most of the citizens in the
state had no issue with the phrase being displayed on their license plates,
what most citizens feel about something “is not the test.” 96 The Maynards’
personal objection to the motto determined whether their right to free
speech was violated because “[t]he First Amendment protects the right of
individuals to hold a point of view different from the majority and to refuse
to foster . . . an idea they find morally objectionable.” 97 As members of the
Jehovah’s Witnesses faith, the Maynards personally found the phrase
morally, politically, and religiously repugnant, since they believed that “life
is more precious than freedom.” 98 Thus, even if every other citizen of New
Hampshire had no objection to the license plate motto, the Maynards’ First
Amendment rights were abridged when they were forced to display the
plate even though they found the speech objectionable. 99 The Court did not
consider what a reasonable observer would perceive the motto
communicated, nor did it consider that the State sought to convey a
message of “appreciation of history, state pride, and individualism.” 100 The
Court only considered what the Maynards personally perceived to
determine whether their personal constitutional rights had been violated.101
Although Wooley involved speech in the form of words, the personal
nature of the right to free speech applies with equal force to speech in the
form of images. In Walker, the Court found that the State of Texas could
not be forced to include a Confederate flag on one of its specialty license
plates because the license plates constituted government speech and the
government, just like private parties, cannot be forced to convey a
particular message. 102 In reaching this holding, the Court did not require the
State to articulate the message that a reasonable observer would perceive in
viewing the image of the Confederate flag, nor was the State required to
object to that specific perception to have a successful claim. 103 The State
merely objected to the image, and the Court held that forcing the State to
display the image would violate the First Amendment. 104
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.
(2015).
103.
104.

See 430 U.S. at 715, 717.
Id. at 715.
Id.
Id. at 707 n.2.
See id. at 717.
Id.
See id. at 715.
Walker v. Tex. Div., Sons of Confederate Veterans, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 2239, 2253
See id. at 2252-53.
See id.
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Additionally, in Hurley the Court evaluated symbolic speech in the form
of a parade, never pondering the reasonable observer’s perception of the
respondent’s float or requiring that Hurley specifically object to that
perception. 105 The Court found that Hurley had the right to refuse to allow
the respondent’s participation in the parade because, “whatever the reason,
it boils down to the choice of a speaker not to propound a particular point of
view, and that choice is presumed to lie beyond the government’s power to
control.” 106
Wooley, Hurley, and Walker highlight a fundamental principle—free
speech is a personal right that allows a citizen to speak or refrain from
speaking for any reason or no reason at all. Thus, contrary to the approach
of the Tenth Circuit in Cressman, the reasonable observer has no business
being used exclusively in the analysis.
C. One Symbol, Numerous Interpretations
Speech in any form is subject to multiple interpretations. 107 Not only do
words have different meanings in different contexts, but so do symbols,
making symbolic speech and its protection under the First Amendment an
area of significant confusion and controversy. Although allowing First
Amendment protection to encompass any interpretation of a symbol would
be overbroad, simply confining that protection to what a court deems a
reasonable observer would perceive from a symbol is too narrow to
sufficiently protect the rights of citizens to speak or refrain from speaking
in every context. When a citizen voluntarily waves an upside-down flag
displaying a peace sign on his private property, 108 utilizing the perception of
the reasonable observer to determine the message of the symbolic speech
may be appropriate and useful. 109 However, when a court determines the
105. See Hurley v. Irish-Am. Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Grp. of Bos., 515 U.S. 557
(1995).
106. Id. at 575.
107. See Wright, supra note 5, at 1245 (“[A]udience members may perceive a fairly wide
range of intended messages, and in some cases, only a fraction of the audience will perceive
any intended message, let alone the actual intended message. But then, the speaker may
intend different messages for different audience members, for various, legitimate reasons.
Different messages intended for different audience members should hardly deprive the
speech of its character as speech for First Amendment purposes.”).
108. See Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405, 406 (1974) (per curiam).
109. The reasonable observer test is appropriate in this circumstance because the
claimant is seeking to invoke his First Amendment right to free speech to protect expressive
conduct he created (hanging a flag with an upside down peace sign out of a window) and
was not compelled to display, as opposed to a situation like Keith Cressman’s, where the
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constitutional protection of symbolic speech where a citizen is compelled to
display a symbol, such as an image or phrase on a license plate, exclusive
use of the reasonable observer test does not adequately protect citizens’
constitutional rights because the citizens did not choose the license plate
design—unlike the boy who chose to display the upside-down flag
exhibiting a peace sign—but instead were compelled to display the license
plate or suffer a penalty. In this situation, what a reasonable observer
perceives a symbol to communicate wholly disregards other logical
interpretations and perceptions of the symbol, as the meaning behind a
symbol is rarely limited to one logical interpretation. 110 Thus, because
symbolic speech in the compelled-speech context is unique, Hurley should
not be interpreted as making the Spence-Johnson test either wholly
necessary or unnecessary for First Amendment protection of symbolic
speech; rather, the test should be viewed as providing optional factors for
consideration of symbolic speech protection.
D. Hurley: Dispensing With the Rigid Spence-Johnson Test In Favor of
Flexibility
Recognizing the difficulties that the Spence-Johnson test presented for
citizens bringing symbolic-speech claims, a reasonable interpretation of the
Court’s opinion in Hurley is that it dispensed with the factors as
prerequisites. 111 The Court’s statement that “a narrow, succinctly articulable
message is not a condition of constitutional protection” 112 may fairly lead to
the conclusion that the first factor of the Spence-Johnson test, a
particularized message, is not required in assessing the constitutional
protection accorded to symbolic speech. Further, the Court’s failure to
address the second factor of the Spence-Johnson test, the likelihood that the
message would be understood by viewers, 113 also may reasonably lead to
the conclusion that it is not a requirement. The Tenth Circuit in Cressman
government created the speech (the Native American image on a license plate) which he is
compelled to display, contrary to his personal objections. Where a party is compelled to
speak, the reasonable observer may not encompass his perception of the symbol to which he
objects. The differing motives of the creators of symbolic speech under scrutiny should
dictate the appropriateness of the “reasonable observer” test.
110. For example, an image of a covered wagon may be interpreted by some to represent
the pioneer days in the United States or the migration of settlers to the west in colonial times,
and may represent to others the University of Oklahoma mascot, the Sooner Schooner.
111. See cases cited supra note 6.
112. See Hurley v. Irish-Am. Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Grp. of Bos., 515 U.S. 557, 569
(1995).
113. See Spence, 418 U.S. at 410-11.
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even noted that “the Court’s decision in Hurley ‘suggested the SpenceJohnson factors are not necessarily prerequisites for First Amendment
protection for symbolic speech.’” 114 The Tenth Circuit nonetheless
incorrectly relied entirely on the second element of the Spence-Johnson test
by analyzing whether a reasonable observer would perceive the Native
American image to communicate the same message to which Cressman
objected. 115
E. The Common Thread of Context
Although the Tenth Circuit’s analysis and holding can fit within an
interpretation of symbolic-speech jurisprudence, the same can be said for
virtually any symbolic-speech analysis due to the Court’s lack of apparent
direction in Hurley and beyond. The Court has already explicitly ruled that
a citizen may refrain from communicating the ideological messages on
state-issued license plates if that citizen disagrees with those messages, and
that forcing a citizen to display those messages is compelled speech. 116
While First Amendment protection is dependent upon whether the words or
symbols are classified as speech, one common thread in nearly every free
speech case is the Court’s consideration of context. 117
1. The Context of License Plates
In the context of license plates, where citizens are forced to display on
their private property the state-issued license plate containing the state’s
chosen words or symbols, a citizen should be able to object to being forced
to display his or her reasonable interpretation of the message. This is not to
say that a citizen may object to a license plate image like the Native
American image because it offends him in any way imaginable, such as
offending his anti-war beliefs by including a bow and arrow. Conversely,
when a citizen has a free-speech objection to a message on a license plate,
courts should consider his or her specific objection and determine whether
such an interpretation of the message is (1) reasonable and (2)
ideological. 118
114. Cressman v. Thompson, 798 F.3d 938, 955 (10th Cir. 2015) (quoting Cressman I,
719 F.3d 1139, 1149 (10th Cir. 2013)).
115. See id. at 958.
116. See Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 717 (1977).
117. See cases cited supra note 54 and accompanying text; see also Spence, 418 U.S. at
410 (“[T]he context in which a symbol is used for purposes of expression is important, for
the context may give meaning to the symbol.”).
118. Ideological considerations could include those ideals protected by the United States
Constitution, i.e., freedom of religion or the right to bear arms.
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Confining the message of symbolic speech merely to what a reasonable
observer would attribute to the symbol offends the underlying premise of
free speech in the First Amendment—the right of citizens “to hold a point
of view different from the majority and to refuse to foster . . . an idea they
find morally objectionable” 119—a premise the Tenth Circuit failed to stay
true to in its Cressman decision.
2. The Tenth Circuit’s Narrow Contextual Analysis
In Cressman, the Tenth Circuit noted that the reasonable observer would
have knowledge of the Sacred Rain Arrow sculpture and the legend behind
it. 120 But it also stated that the reasonable observer would know about the
tourism-based motivation of the legislators who designed the plate. 121
Instead of acknowledging that some Oklahomans, like Cressman, would
possess knowledge of the legend behind the Native American image, and
lack knowledge about the legislative intent behind the license plate design,
the Tenth Circuit confined the only viable free-speech objection to the
intent of the Oklahoma legislators by asserting that to be the reasonable
observer’s perception of the Native American image. 122 While relying on an
almost omniscient reasonable observer’s interpretation of speech in some
circumstances may be appropriate, it is not appropriate in the context of
license plates. As a result, an objector’s reasonable and ideological
interpretation of the speech on a license plate should invoke First
Amendment protection when he or she is being compelled to speak by
displaying a state-issued license plate. Although most Oklahomans
presumably do not have an objection to the Native American image, Keith
Cressman does. 123 Regardless of what his objection is, he should not be
compelled to display the message on a “mobile billboard” where his
objection is both reasonable and ideological. Under the Tenth Circuit’s
reasoning, if Cressman had found the Native American history of
Oklahoma to be offensive, this would be enough for his claim to be
successful because it is what the reasonable observer would perceive from
the Native American image. 124 However, Cressman’s much more
understandable claim of a religious nature is not enough because it does not

119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.

Wooley, 430 U.S. at 715.
Cressman, 798 F.3d at 959.
Id.
Id. at 960.
Id. at 943.
See id. at 965 (McHugh, J., concurring).
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line up with a few judges’ views of the reasonable observer. 125
Consequently, Cressman is forced to display the image on a daily basis to
hundreds of people—an injustice which the First Amendment aims to
prevent.
F. A Symbolic Speech Solution Implicit in Hurley: A Flexible Test Going
Forward
Treating the Spence-Johnson factors as optional, rather than as
prerequisites to First Amendment protection of symbolic speech, is the
most appropriate approach when symbolic and compelled speech collide—
specifically in the realm of license plates. As illustrated by the various
forms of symbolic expression that have come before courts, the outcome of
symbolic speech cases is largely dictated not only by the historical and
cultural context of the expression, but also the specific form the expression
takes. 126 Such a notion was explicitly highlighted by the Supreme Court in
Hurley when it explained that requiring a particularized message for First
Amendment free-speech protection would fail to include some clear forms
of expression that require protection.127 Thus, while in some situations the
Spence-Johnson test sufficiently determines symbolic speech, in others, the
context is of greater relevance and the test factors are better utilized as
persuasive support.
The law of symbolic speech is in disarray, and although Hurley seemed
to cause more confusion amongst lower courts, its lack of explicit direction
can actually be interpreted as guidance by the Supreme Court.128 By
minimizing the importance of strict adherence to the Spence-Johnson test,
the Court recognized the need for flexibility in this context-specific area of
law. 129 The approach of allowing a citizen to object to a reasonable and
ideological message he or she perceives is communicated by a symbol on a
state-issued license plate complies with this recognized need for
flexibility—a rule appropriate in the specific context of license plates.
125. See id.
126. See, e.g., Hurley v. Irish-Am. Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Grp. of Bos., 515 U.S. 557
(1995) (involving a petitioner seeking free-speech protection for a parade); Wooley v.
Maynard, 430 U.S. 705 (1977) (involving a petitioner seeking free-speech protection to
refrain from displaying a license plate); Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393
U.S. 503 (1969) (involving a petitioner seeking free-speech protection for wearing arm
bands at school).
127. See Hurley, 515 U.S. at 569 (for example, a “painting of Jackson Pollock, music of
Arnold Schoenberg, or Jabberwocky verse of Lewis Carroll”).
128. See cases cited supra note 6.
129. See Hurley, 515 U.S. at 557.
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Although Cressman relied too heavily on the second part of the SpenceJohnson test by focusing on the narrow view of the reasonable observer, the
Tenth Circuit’s recognition that a particularized message is not necessary
for symbolic-speech protection was a partial adherence to the Supreme
Court’s teachings in Hurley. But in the specific context of license plates—“mobile billboards” which citizens are compelled by the government to
display on a daily basis to countless people—a court’s determination of the
narrow message perceived by the reasonable observer should not be the
only viable First Amendment objection a citizen may make. Instead, a
citizen’s reasonable and ideological interpretation of the message on a
license plate to which he or she objects should allow him or her to, at the
very least, display a specialty license plate for the same price as the stateissued license plate.
Hayley Ray Scott
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